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I am very grateful to Professor Diane Amann for the invitation to contrib-
ute to this symposium and, in particular, for being asked to focus on defense-
related issues at the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court). Having 
heard from Peter Robinson regarding some of the things that the defense can 
do to help the Court, I hope to complement Peter’s important contribution by 
highlighting some of the things that external observers—particularly those of 
us who research and write on international criminal justice—can do to assist 
ICC accused. Broadly speaking, I would like to highlight the compelling need 
for us to better monitor and critique ICC practice, especially procedural and 
evidentiary decision-making. 
For this external contribution to benefit the defense, ICC observers must 
commit to unwavering fair trial expectations. Ensuring a just process for ICC 
suspects and accused persons needs to become a regular and prominent part 
of our discourse, and every bit as much the lens through which we view the 
ICC as other concerns, including the anti-impunity objective and the rights of 
victims. It also means that we need to become comparativists, as it is only 
through understanding the Court’s “hybrid” framework that we can properly 
vet whether ICC practice is fair and just. This is critical because the Court’s 
Statute and Rules tend not to dictate specific evidentiary and procedural 
choices, a fact that can lead to importing domestic mechanisms without care-
ful thought as to whether their insertion into the Court’s unique framework is 
fair to the accused. As I hope to convince you, this flexibility makes consistent 
external vetting vital. 
Because the procedural and evidentiary decision-making that requires this 
more rigorous review sometimes relies on the principle of objectivity—the 
statutory requirement that the Court’s prosecutor “establish the truth” by in-
vestigating incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally—I will first 
discuss this under-researched (and, in my view, unfulfilled) aspect of the 
ICC’s procedural law. I hope you will then add this analysis to the lens 
through which you view Court practice. I will then provide a few examples of 
recent (and, again, under-researched) procedural and evidentiary choices that 
appear to overlook the import of predominantly adversarial trial model the 
Court has adopted to date in a way that undermines the fair trial rights of ICC 
accused. I hope that by briefly highlighting these limited examples you too 
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will see the urgent need for the international community to keep a close watch 
on developing ICC practice. 
As has been discussed at length elsewhere, the ICC’s procedural law is 
neither wholly adversarial nor continental, but instead a mix of the two.1 In 
fact, the Court’s Statute affords sufficient flexibility for trials to be either ad-
versarial in orientation or rather more aligned with the continental (single-
case) model, in which the judges, rather than the parties, lead the taking of 
evidence.2 Nevertheless, and as will be important for later discussion, all the 
Court’s trials to date have adhered to the adversarial model, with party-driven 
evidence collection and presentation, and with a distinct prosecution phase 
that is formally closed before hearing from the defense.3 By contrast, the 
aforementioned principle of objectivity is decidedly continental in nature. 
The principle of objectivity is set out in Article 54(1)(a) of the Rome Stat-
ute, a provision that obliges the Court’s Prosecutor to investigate incriminat-
ing and exonerating circumstances equally.4 This continental addition to the 
ICC Statute was initially lauded by many as a vast improvement over the com-
mon law-esque prosecutor at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and its sister court, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda.5 As explained by Judge May before the Court became 
operational “the prosecutor of the ICC will have duties of ‘truth-seeking’ be-
yond the adversarial framework, and must conduct investigations to find both 
incriminating and exonerating evidence. (Whereas the prosecutor of the ad 
hoc tribunals has been under a duty to disclose, rather than seek such evi-
dence).”6 As one continental delegate to the Rome Conference later explained 
to me, the neutral, truth-seeking investigations dictated by the Rome Statute—
if properly applied—ought to yield only successful prosecutions. 
By this benchmark, the fact that the ICC has thus far acquitted as many 
persons tried for core crimes as it has convicted suggests that objectivity in 
 
 1 On the Court’s sui generis framework see, e.g., Kai Ambos, International Criminal 
Procedure: ‘Adversarial,’ ‘Inquisitorial’ or Mixed?, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2003).   
 2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 64(8)(b), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3; Robert Heinsch, How to Achieve Fair and Expeditious Trial Proceedings Be-
fore the ICC: Is it Time for a More Judge-Dominated Approach?, in THE EMERGING 
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 479, 490 (Carsten Stahn & Göran 
Sluiter eds., 2009). 
3 Megan A. Fairlie, The Unlikely Prospect of Non-Adversarial Trials at the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 295, 295-96 (2018). 
 4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 54(1)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3.  
 5 Luc Cˆot´e, Independence and Impartiality, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS 319, 359 
(Luc Reydams et al. eds., 2012). 
 6 RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 330 (2002) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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practice is falling short of the mark.7 More convincingly, this fact has been 
affirmatively recognized by a number of the Court’s judges. Since the Court’s 
earliest days, judicial opinions have catalogued numerous objectivity short-
comings, including the prosecution’s intentional failure to collect known ex-
culpatory evidence,8 the use of interview techniques that were “utterly inap-
propriate” in light of the obligation to seek exonerating evidence,9 and a 
“negligent attitude towards verifying the trustworthiness of its evidence.”10  
Similarly, defense counsel have reported a consistent failure on the part of the 
prosecution to corroborate its witnesses’ accounts,11 leaving defense attorneys 
to pick up this slack.12 
This apparent abdication of the prosecution’s intended role as objective 
and impartial truth-seeker has very real consequences for the defense.  In the 
best case scenario, the defense will be required to use its more limited inves-
tigatory resources to fill the void left by the prosecution’s neglected 54(1)(a) 
obligations. More problematically, in cases wherein governments hinder de-
fense investigations in situ,13 evidentiary materials and witness statements 
beneficial to an ICC accused may never be accessed at all. In addition, alt-
hough the principle of objectivity has yet to materialize in practice, the manner 
in which it is meant to enhance the fairness of ICC proceedings may be used 
(and, as I will explain, has been used) to justify the denial of other procedural 
 
    7 Until quite recently, acquittals for core crime cases (four) outnumbered convictions 
(three). Mark Ellis, The Latest Crisis of the ICC: The Acquittal of Laurent Gbagbo, OPINIO 
JURIS (Mar. 28, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/03/28/the-latest-crisis-of-the-icc-the-ac-
quittal-of-laurent-gbagbo/. The Court’s record is now even due to the July 2019 conviction 
of Bosco Ntaganda. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-2359, Judgment (July 8, 
2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_03568.PDF.    
     8 “The omission of the Prosecutor in this case to gather exculpatory evidence of which 
he was aware is another reason marking the failure of the Prosecutor to make disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence to the defence.”  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1486, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial 
Chamber I Entitled “Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Ma-
terials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution 
of the Accused, Together With Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008,” (Oct. 21, 2008), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05884.PDF.  
     9 Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 51 (Dec. 16, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/ 
CR2011_22538.PDF.  
     10 Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-728, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine 
Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 4 (Apr. 26, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2013_ 
03280.PDF (opining, in ¶1, that “the facts show that the Prosecution had not complied with 
its obligations under 54(1)(a) at the time when it sought confirmation….”). 
 11 Caroline Buisman, The Prosecutor’s Obligation to Investigate Incriminating and Ex-
onerating Circumstances Equally: Illusion or Reality, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 205, 215-16 
(2014). 
 12 Karim A.A. Khan & Anand A. Shah, Defensive Practices: Representing Clients be-
fore the International Criminal Court, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 191, 221 (2014). 
 13 Buisman, supra note 7, at 208. 
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safeguards. In other words, a failure to adhere to the principle of objectivity 
may ultimately disadvantage the defense multiple times over.   
Despite these important consequences, the prosecution’s non-compliance 
with 54(1)(a) has thus far generated insufficient external attention. Perhaps 
this is because the idea of an objective prosecutorial investigation is, at least 
for common law lawyers, somewhat akin to a unicorn—so fantastical a notion 
that its failure to exist is not worthy of remark. Whatever the reason, this rel-
ative silence harms both the Court and the defense. Without a robust call for 
the prosecution to take its objectivity obligation seriously, it likely will not.  
And, without clear and cogent critiques on the topic, we can likewise expect 
for judicial decisions to continue to cite to the provision as a safeguard that 
makes other protections unnecessary. So, one of the opportunities for renewal 
called for by this conference lies in an affirmative decision to call attention to 
this issue: to incorporate it into our discourse, to read and cite to what defense 
attorneys are saying about this prosecutorial failure, and to make sure to in-
clude the defense in the brainstorming required to effectuate meaningful 
change. 
Another critical issue that has been flagged by several of the Court’s 
judges, but has thus far garnered almost no scholarly attention, is the recent 
trend amongst ICC Trial Chambers to permit the submission of “evidence” in 
the absence of a contemporaneous ruling on its admissibility.14 This submis-
sion in lieu of admission approach hinges on the language of Article 69(4), 
which provides that a Chamber “may rule on the relevance or admissibility of 
any evidence,” and was first endorsed by the ICC Appeals Chamber in 2011.15 
More recently, a majority of the Appeals Chamber again addressed the matter, 
confirming that Trial Chambers may refrain from ruling on admissibility en-
tirely and, instead, simply consider the relevance and probative value of sub-
mitted material “when deciding on the guilt or innocence of the accused.”16 
 
   14 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15-497, Initial Directions on the Con-
duct of the Proceedings, ¶ 24 (July 13, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/ 
CR2016_04979.PDF (providing that “[a]s a general rule, this Chamber will defer its as-
sessment of the admissibility of the evidence until deliberating its judgment pursuant to 
Article 74(2) of the Statute”). 
 15 Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-1386 OA5 OA6, Judgment on the Appeals of 
Bemba et al. against the decision of Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on the admission 
into evidence of materials contained in the prosecution’s list of evidence” , ¶ 37, (May 3, 
2011), http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2011.05.03_Prosecutor_v_Bemba 
.pdf (noting that “the Trial Chamber must balance its discretion to defer consideration” of 
admissibility with its obligation to a fair and expeditious trial and that Trial Chambers must 
“consider the relevance, probative value and the potential prejudice of each item of evi-
dence at some point in the proceedings”).   
    16  Prosecutor v. Bemba et. al., ICC-01/05-01/13-2275-Red, Judgment on the Appeals of 
Bemba et al. against the decision of Trial Chamber VII entitled “Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute,” ¶ 598 (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/ 
CR2018_01638.PDF.  
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The problems created by importing this continental evidentiary approach 
into the ICC’s present practice are legion. At the Court, unlike in many conti-
nental systems, the collection of would-be evidence is not a highly regulated 
process nor, as we have seen, are these materials amassed by a neutral minister 
of justice. Moreover, as ICC judges act without the guidance of a neutral and 
comprehensive case-file, admissibility assessments conducted in the absence 
of party input may well amount to a “blind and blundering” affair, as the 
judges are liable to be “partially informed and innocent of details.”17 More to 
the issue at hand, the approach further directly and negatively impacts the de-
fense because of the Court’s adversarial trial orientation. If the defense is left 
unaware as to whether the material proffered by the prosecution is in fact ad-
missible, this necessitates that counsel respond to all materials submitted, a 
course of action that dilutes limited defense resources and hinders the ac-
cused’s ability to successfully counter the prosecution’s case. 
For more than three years, these and other problems associated with sub-
mission in lieu of admission have been affirmatively raised in a series of sep-
arate and dissenting Court opinions. In 2016, for example, Judge Henderson 
warned that an accused cannot make an informed decision regarding whether 
to put on a defense if, at the close of the prosecution’s case, it is unclear which 
of the prosecution’s proffered material the Chamber will consider.18 In other 
words, the decision to defer admissibility decisions pointedly disadvantages 
the defense’s role within the Trial Chamber’s chosen adversarial model. Judge 
Henderson has likewise explained the dangers of importing the approach, un-
tethered from the attendant procedural protections found in continental sys-
tems, into the Court’s adversarial trial model.19  And, more than two years 
after his initial objection to submission in lieu of admission in Gbagbo and 
Blé Goudé, Henderson described the practice as an “extravagant failure.”20 
Among other problems, Judge Henderson noted that the prosecution’s failure 
 
 17 Mirjan Damaška, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American 
and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 850 (1997) (discussing the dangers 
of ill-informed judges leading evidence). 
    18 Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15-405-Anx, Decision on the submission and ad-
mission of evidence, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Henderson, ¶ 9 (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6fbd2c/pdf/.   
    19 Prosecutor v. Bemba et. al., ICC-01/05-01/13-2275-Anx, Judgment on the Appeals of 
Bemba et. al.  against the decision of Trial Chamber VII entitled “Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute,” Separate Opinion of Judge Geoffrey Henderson, ¶¶ 45 & 51 
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2018_01633.PDF (comparing 
judge-driven trial proceedings and “the safeguard of an independent nonpartisan investi-
gating judicial officer and a central dossier” with adversarial evidence-gathering and 
presentation).  
    20 Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15-1172-Anx, Decision concerning the Prosecu-
tor’s submission of documentary evidence, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Geoffrey Hender-
son, ¶ 1 (June 1, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2018_02846.PDF.  
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to explain the import of the items it submitted  “place[d] an unfair and imper-
missible burden on the defense requiring them to justify that the evidence is 
not relevant.”21 
Further, fair trial problems associated with submission in lieu of admission 
were also raised in Bemba’s recent acquittal on appeal. In that matter, Judges 
Van den Wyngaert and Morrison opined that the approach was wholly unac-
ceptable in a core crimes prosecution, maintaining instead that not only ought 
admissibility assessments be made at the time of submission, but that this ex-
ercise should be  “sufficiently rigorous[] to avoid crowding the case with ev-
idence of inferior quality.”22  The pair also joined Judge Eboe-Osuji in his 
concern that “the undifferentiated receipt of all evidence ‘submitted’ at 
[Bemba’s] trial may have resulted in the adulteration of admissible evidence 
with inadmissible ones, hence possibly alleviating the prosecution’s burden 
of proof.”23 
Much more needs to be said on this practice, particularly its negative im-
pact on fair and expeditious trials, both because the approach has garnered 
insufficient external attention to date24 and because submission in lieu of ad-
mission continues to be both employed and challenged at the Court.25 Rele-
vant critiques must expressly reject the thinly reasoned evidentiary decision-
making produced under this approach. Chambers ought not to be able to dis-
miss the call for contemporaneous admissibility determinations as “unhelpful 
 
 21 Id. ¶ 4. 
    22 Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2, Judgment on the Appeal of Jean 
Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute,” Separate Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert and Judge Morrison, ¶ 18 (June 8, 
2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2.  
    23 Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx3, Judgment on the Appeal of Jean 
Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute,” Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, ¶ 85 (June 14, 2018), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2018_03077.PDF.  
    24 These limited critiques nevertheless benefit from internal perspective. Amnesty Inter-
national’s two posts on the issue—Admitting mistakes on admitting evidence – It’s Not Too 
Late for the ICC to Get it Right (May 4, 2018) (available at https://hrij.amnesty.nl/icc-
bemba-et-al-judgment-admitting-mistakes-on-admitting-evidence/) and Time to Clarify 
ICC Rules on Admission of Evidence, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 5, 2018), https://hrij.am-
nesty.nl/time-to-clarify-icc-rules-admission-evidence/—were both authored by Chiara 
Loiero, who served as (pro bono) legal assistant on Bemba (Main Case) during the sen-
tencing and appeal phase. The issue is also covered in a recent chapter authored by a prac-
tcing international criminal defense attorney. See Colleen Rohan, The Hybrid System of 
International Criminal Law: A Work in Progress or Just a Noble Experiment?, in 
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS ATROCITIES: CRIMINOLOGICAL AND SOCIO-LEGAL 
APPROACHES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Aksenova, van Sliedregt & Parmentier 
eds., 2019). 
    25 See Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15-1519-Red, Public Redacted Version of 
‘Defence Request and Observations on Trial Chamber IX’s Evidentiary Regime’ (May 21, 
2019), https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/39912a/pdf/.  
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and unwarranted”,26 while wholly sidestepping any meaningful discussion re-
garding how its alternative choice operates within the Court’s system of par-
tisan evidence-gathering and submission. Without this call for better reasoned 
decision-making, Trial Chambers may continue to make abstract references 
to the Statute’s permissive language, in conjunction with the old chestnut of 
being “professional judges,” to justify submission in lieu of admission. To 
borrow from Justice Harlan, these decontextualized observations amount to 
the substitution of words for analysis.27 
Before closing, let me briefly mention some of the Court’s recent jurispru-
dence regarding no case to answer (NCTA) motions as a final example of 
decontextualized procedural decision-making that disadvantages the defense. 
As is well-known, there is no express ICC authority for the defense to request 
a verdict of acquittal after the prosecution has closed its case. T\Notably, this   
,  “lacuna” stems from the fact that a decisive trial model was not agreed upon 
before the Court became operational.28 rather than any affirmative decision to 
exclude the practice. Accordingly, as Trial Chambers have since adopted a 
party-driven process that mandates the sequential presentation of evidence by 
the parties, NCTA motions have (unsurprisingly) made their way into ICC 
practice. Critically, however, silence in the Court’s procedural law on the is-
sue has been interpreted to mean that whether an accused may avail of this 
“judicial guarantee of the presumption of innocence”29 is a matter of judicial 
discretion. This fact alone is enough to give one pause. Moreover, in exercis-
ing that discretion so as to preclude the NCTA option, ICC decisions tend to 
wholly avoid any meaningful discussion regarding the critical role that the 
NCTA option plays in ensuring the fairness of adversarial trial proceedings. 
For example, in exercising its discretion regarding the permissibility of 
NCTA motions, the Ntaganda Trial Chamber failed to consider how the avail-
ability of the motion—or its absence—might impact the fairness of the pro-
ceedings, other than recognizing that allowing such a motion might impact 
the length of the trial.30 In effect, the Chamber’s (quite limited) “analysis” 
focused exclusively on whether an NCTA motion would expedite the trial 
proceedings. It then used the uncertainty regarding this issue as its basis for 
 
   26 Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15-615, Decision on Prosecution Request to 
Submit Interception Related Evidence, ¶ 7 (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour 
tRecords/CR2016_25513.PDF.  
   27 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 28 Hakan Friman et. al., Charges, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES 
AND RULES 382, 450 (Sluiter et. al., eds., 2013) (describing this lack of consensus as “re-
grettable”). 
 29 Stephen C. Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 241, 316 (1998). 
30 Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-1931, Decision on Defence request for 
leave to file a ‘no case to answer’ motion, ¶ 26 (June 1, 2017), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_03545.PDF.   
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denying the motion, even going so far as to suggest a partially successful mo-
tion might not pay its way if insufficiently expeditious.31 This suggests a fail-
ure to appreciate the depth of protection that NCTA motions provide in party-
led proceedings. Irrespective of whether a partially successful motion would 
hasten the end of a trial, what is critical is that even partial success ensures 
that an accused is not made to answer a charge for which the presumption of 
innocence has not been rebutted. 
Case law on this topic seems unlikely to improve, in particular due to the 
judgment rendered in response to Ntaganda’s appeal. Not only did the Ap-
peals Chamber confirm that Trial Chambers have broad discretion with re-
spect to NCTA motions, but it also offered a questionable explanation for why 
the failure to hear such motions is consistent with a fair trial.32 Specifically, 
the Chamber pointed to two, continental-oriented safeguards found in the 
Court’s procedural law—one of which being the aforementioned (and, as 
demonstrated, unfulfilled) principle of objectivity—in an apparent attempt to 
demonstrate that the presence of these “bonus” (not found in adversarial sys-
tems) protections eliminate the need for the ICC to replicate every adversarial-
oriented safeguard.33 This argument was hardly convincing as applied, how-
ever, as neither of the mechanisms noted shield the accused from having to 
answer charges for which the prosecution has failed to rebut the presumption 
of innocence. 34   
These critiques aside, the decision to preclude NCTA motions at the 
ICC—first in Ntaganda and, more recently, in the Ongwen case35—reflects 
poorly on the Court’s perceived commitment to ensuring fair proceedings. It 
also suggests either an unwillingness or inability to learn from relevant ICTY 
precedent.  The Tribunal considered its first NCTA motion before the practice 
was affirmatively incorporated into the ICTY’s procedural law, a move that 
drew praise for demonstrating “great concern for the rights of the accused and, 
in particular, the presumption of innocence.”36 Over the years, the process was 
both codified and amended, most notably by requiring oral arguments instead 
 
    31 Id. (“permitting such a motion may …. not necessarily positively affect the expedi-
tiousness of the trial, even if successful in part”).  
 32 Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-2026, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Bosco 
Ntaganda against the “Decision on Defence request for leave to file a ‘no case to answer’ 
motion,” ¶ 52 (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05424.PDF. 
     33 Id.  
34 In addition to the principle of objectivity, the Chamber highlighted the ICC’s confir-
mation of charges stage, which requires the prosecution to satisfy the Pre-Trial Chamber 
that there is “sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person 
committed the crime charged” before proceeding to trial. Id.  
    35 Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15-1309, Decision on Defence Request for 
Leave to File a No Case to Answer Motion (July 18, 2018), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_03771.PDF.  
 36 SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 91 
(2003). 
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of written briefs, a change that bore immediate efficiency rewards for ICTY 
accused and the Tribunal alike.37 Had the ICC chosen to draw from and im-
prove upon this experience,  it could have advanced its sociological legitimacy 
while simultaneously contributing to the twin goals of fairness and efficiency.   
In presenting this handful of examples, I hope I have convinced you of the 
need for more robust vetting of ICC practice so as to better protect the rights 
of the defense. In case more convincing is required, let me close by quoting 
from a notably persuasive and profoundly respected source. As Judge Pat 
Wald observed after her impactful stint at the ICTY, those accused interna-
tionally often lack the full support of the international community “because 
the scope and nature of [international] crimes are so repellent, some victim 
witnesses so fragile, and the voices of NGO observers so vocal in their desire 
for individual accountability.” 38 As a result, Judge Wald emphasized the need 
for judicial vigilance, “lest the persistent cry of victims that ‘someone should 
pay’ be transformed into a demand for punishment against whomever is in the 
dock.”39 For Judge Wald, however, judicial vigilance was not enough.  In-
stead, she recognized that outside observers played a critical role in ensuring 
the fairness of international criminal prosecutions, and called upon them to 
“watch carefully to see that [the judges] do not go past rational stopping points 
too quickly.” 40 
Remarkably, Judge Wald’s observations apply with equal force to the ICC 
in 2019 as they did to the ICTY in 2003. Like the ICTY before it, the Court 
needs “evidentiary mavens”41 and comparativsts to keep the development of 
its hybrid practice in check, for its benefit and that of the defense. This exer-
cise has only scratched the surface when it comes to identifying aspects of 
ICC practice that would benefit from robust external critique. For this en-
deavor to be comprehensive, we need the insight of internal actors. This means 
working as closely with defense counsel as the prosecution in our attempts to 
identify the best path forward for the Court. As with this conference, the de-
fense needs to have a seat at the table whenever we meet to discuss the present 
and future of the ICC. Likewise, we should commit to reading and citing de-
fense-oriented critiques, and to encouraging members of the defense bar in all 
 
 37 Twelfth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/60/267 S/2005/532 (2005) (noting, 
at ¶ 95, how this revised approach resulted in a prompt, oral NCTA decision). 
 38 Patricia M. Wald, Rules of Evidence in the Yugoslav War Tribunal, 21 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 761, 775 (2003). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 771. 
 41 Id. 
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their scholarly endeavors, from blogging to book chapters and law review ar-
ticles. To paraphrase Judge Wald, the long-term credibility of the ICC might 
well depend on it.42 
 
 
 
 
 42 Id. at 776. 
